



The *Qur'ān* as Legal Proof: Authority, Language, and Juristic Argument in al-Jaṣṣāṣ's *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*

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Abstract

This article examines how Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ constructs the *Qur'ān* as authoritative legal proof in *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*. While the *Qur'ān* is universally recognized as the primary source of Islamic law, its legal meanings are not treated by classical jurists as self-evident or automatically operative. This study addresses the problem of how Qur'anic wording is transformed into binding legal doctrine through language, proof hierarchy, and Ḥanafī juristic reasoning. Using a qualitative library-based textual method, the article applies document analysis, qualitative content analysis, and legal-hermeneutical interpretation to *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* as the main corpus and *al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl* as an internal theoretical reference. The findings show that al-Jaṣṣāṣ constructs Qur'anic authority as procedural authority: legal meaning is produced through the analysis of *lafẓ*, *dalālah*, *mujmal*, *bayān*, *qirā'ah*, *khabar*, *qiyās*, *ijmā'*, *atsar*, and *madhhab*-based argumentation. The study further demonstrates that *sunnah* and *khabar* function as clarifying and epistemically graded proofs without displacing the *Qur'ān*'s central authority, while Ḥanafī reasoning organizes evidence into a coherent hierarchy of legal validity. The article contributes to Qur'anic studies and Islamic legal theory by repositioning *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* not merely as a work of legal exegesis, but as an applied laboratory of Ḥanafī legal hermeneutics in which scripture becomes law through disciplined interpretive procedure.

keywords: al-jaṣṣāṣ, qur'anic legal exegesis, textual authority, ḥanafī jurisprudence, islamic legal hermeneutics

Abstrak

Artikel ini mengkaji bagaimana Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ membangun *al-Qur'ān* sebagai bukti hukum yang otoritatif dalam *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*. Meskipun *al-Qur'ān* secara umum diakui sebagai sumber utama hukum Islam, makna hukumnya tidak diperlakukan oleh para fuqahā klasik sebagai sesuatu yang berdiri sendiri atau otomatis berlaku tanpa proses interpretasi. Penelitian ini berfokus pada persoalan bagaimana redaksi Qur'ani ditransformasikan menjadi doktrin hukum yang mengikat melalui bahasa, hierarki dalil, dan penalaran fikih Ḥanafī. Dengan menggunakan metode kualitatif berbasis studi pustaka, artikel ini menerapkan analisis dokumen, analisis isi kualitatif, dan interpretasi hermeneutika hukum terhadap *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* sebagai korpus utama serta *al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl* sebagai rujukan teoritis internal. Temuan penelitian menunjukkan bahwa al-Jaṣṣāṣ membangun otoritas Qur'ani sebagai otoritas prosedural: makna hukum diproduksi melalui analisis lafẓ, dalālah, mujmal, bayān, qirā'ah, khabar, qiyās, ijmā', atsar, dan argumentasi berbasis mazhab. Penelitian ini juga menunjukkan bahwa *sunnah* dan *khabar* berfungsi sebagai dalil penjelas dan bukti yang dinilai secara epistemik tanpa menggantikan otoritas sentral *al-Qur'ān*, sementara penalaran Ḥanafī mengorganisasi bukti hukum ke dalam hierarki validitas yang koheren. Artikel ini berkontribusi pada kajian *al-Qur'ān* dan teori hukum Islam dengan memosisikan *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* bukan sekadar sebagai karya tafsir hukum, melainkan sebagai laboratorium terapan hermeneutika hukum Ḥanafī, tempat teks wahyu menjadi hukum melalui prosedur interpretasi yang disiplin.

kata kunci: al-jaṣṣāṣ, tafsir hukum al-qur'an, otoritas tekstual, fikih ḥanafī, hermeneutika hukum islam



Introduction

The *Qur'an* occupies a foundational position in Islamic legal thought, not only as sacred scripture but also as the primary source of normativity from which obligations, prohibitions, permissions, and juristic classifications are articulated. Yet, within the classical Islamic legal tradition, the *Qur'an* does not operate as legal proof in a simple or self-executing manner. Its authority is mediated through linguistic analysis, prophetic reports, juristic consensus, analogy, legal maxims, and the cumulative interpretive practices of legal schools. Qur'anic legal authority is therefore not merely textual; it is also hermeneutical, since words, commands, general expressions, qualifications, and implied meanings must be processed through disciplined interpretive procedures before they become legally binding conclusions. Modern scholarship has consistently shown that *uṣūl al-fiqh* emerged precisely to theorize this movement from revealed text to legal norm, while *fiqh* represents the articulation of concrete rulings within juristic discourse.¹

This problem remains central to contemporary Islamic studies because legal interpretation continues to be one of the most contested domains in the study of religious authority. International scholarship has increasingly moved away from treating classical juristic texts as static repositories of rulings and toward reading them as complex sites of reasoning, hermeneutics, institutional authority, and legal epistemology. Hallaq, Vishanoff, Gleave, El Shamsy, and Zysow have demonstrated that classical Islamic law cannot be adequately understood through doctrinal outcomes alone; it must also be examined through the procedures that made those outcomes intelligible and persuasive within specific scholarly communities.² Vishanoff reconstructs the formation of Sunni legal hermeneutics through theories of language and revelation,³ while Gleave shows that literal meaning in Islamic legal theory was itself a contested and theoretically productive category.⁴ In this broader scholarly context, the question of how the *Qur'an* becomes “legal proof” is not merely a theological question, but a central problem in the intellectual history of Islamic law.

The importance of this question becomes especially evident in the genre of Qur'anic legal exegesis. *Tafsīr* has never been a purely explanatory activity detached from theology, law, philosophy, or linguistic theory. Recent scholarship has emphasized that Qur'anic exegesis was historically shaped by overlapping theological, philosophical, and legal frameworks, and that exegetes such as al-Rāzī integrated *uṣūl al-fiqh* into their interpretive practice in order to propose new readings and challenge earlier opinions.⁵ This observation is significant for the present study because it shows that legal theory did not merely stand outside *tafsīr* as an auxiliary discipline; rather, it often entered the exegetical process itself as a method for organizing meaning, adjudicating disagreement, and authorizing particular interpretations. Yildirim's discussion of *al-Kāfiyaji* similarly underlines the importance of combining *riwāyah* and *dirāyah* in Qur'anic interpretation, where transmitted reports and rational analysis operate together to secure linguistic, theological, and interpretive coherence.⁶ These studies help situate legal exegesis as a field

¹ Wael B Hallaq, *A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul Al-Fiqh* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Bernard G Weiss, *The Spirit of Islamic Law* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006).

² Hallaq, *A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul Al-Fiqh*; David R Vishanoff, *The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law* (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 2011); Robert Gleave, *Islam and Literalism: Literal Meaning and Interpretation in Islamic Legal Theory* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012); Ahmed El Shamsy, *The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Aron Zysow, *The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory* (Atlanta: Lockwood Press, 2013).

³ Vishanoff, *The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law*.

⁴ Gleave, *Islam and Literalism: Literal Meaning and Interpretation in Islamic Legal Theory*.

⁵ A Oulldali, “When a Usuli Interprets the Qur'an: Aspects of the Acceptance of Legal Theory in the Exegesis of Fahr Al-Din Al-Razi,” *Arabica* 71, no. 1–2 (2024): 141–80, <https://doi.org/10.1163/15700585-20231679>.

⁶ T Yildirim, “Kāfiyaji's Exegetical Method: An Analysis of the First Part of the Treatise Nuzhat Al-Aṣḥāb,” *Hitit Theology Journal* 24, no. 2 (2025): 974–99, <https://doi.org/10.14395/hid.1740054>.

in which textual authority is produced through the interaction of transmission, reason, language, and juridical method.

Within this field, Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Rāzī al-Jaṣṣāṣ, commonly known as al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981), occupies a particularly important position. His *Ahkām al-Qur'an* is among the earliest and most influential works of legal Qur'anic exegesis within the Ḥanafī tradition. The work focuses on Qur'anic verses with legal relevance and interprets them through the conceptual and argumentative resources of Ḥanafī jurisprudence. It is not simply a *tafsīr* that reports lexical meanings or exegetical traditions; it is a juristic commentary that transforms scriptural language into legal doctrine through linguistic reasoning, *uṣūlī* principles, evaluation of reports, analogy, and polemical engagement with competing juristic positions. Read alongside al-Jaṣṣāṣ's *al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl*, *Ahkām al-Qur'an* reveals not only what legal conclusions he defends, but also how he structures the very process by which Qur'anic wording becomes legally authoritative.

The specific scholarly problem addressed in this article lies in the tension between scriptural authority and juristic construction. On the one hand, the *Qur'an* is treated as the highest source of Islamic law. On the other hand, Qur'anic legal meaning is rarely self-evident in the technical sense required by jurists. Legal meaning must be constructed through interpretive operations: determining whether a command indicates obligation or recommendation, whether a general expression remains general or is specified, whether a textual indication is explicit or implicit, whether a prophetic report qualifies a Qur'anic statement, and whether analogy extends or restricts the operative scope of a ruling. In al-Jaṣṣāṣ's *Ahkām al-Qur'an*, this tension becomes especially visible because the text repeatedly moves between Qur'anic wording, Ḥanafī doctrine, disagreement with other jurists, and theoretical principles more fully elaborated in *al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl*. The central issue, therefore, is not simply what rulings al-Jaṣṣāṣ derives from the *Qur'an*, but how he authorizes those rulings as valid legal readings of the Qur'anic text.

Previous scholarship may be grouped into several major orientations. The first examines the historical formation of Islamic legal theory and the rise of juristic schools. Hallaq, Melchert, and El Shamsy have shown that Sunni legal theory and madhhab-based authority emerged through complex processes involving textual canonization, scholarly transmission, and the formation of interpretive communities.⁷ Melchert highlights the ninth- and tenth-century consolidation of Sunni legal affiliations,⁸ while El Shamsy argues that scriptural canonization and hermeneutical analysis were central to the formation of Islamic legal authority.⁹ The second body of scholarship focuses on Islamic legal hermeneutics, especially the role of language, literal meaning, textual indicators, and the epistemology of legal proof. Weiss, Vishanoff, Gleave, and Zysow are particularly relevant here because they examine the conceptual architecture through which jurists moved from revealed texts to normative rulings.¹⁰ The third group deals more directly with Ḥanafī legal reasoning. Sadeghi, for instance, shows that Ḥanafī law-making involves a historically layered relationship between inherited doctrine, juristic values, and textual justification.¹¹

More recent studies sharpen this picture by showing that Ḥanafī legal authority was not built solely upon abstract textualism, but also upon structured practices of

⁷ Hallaq, *A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul Al-Fiqh*; Christopher Melchert, *The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries C.E.* (Leiden: Brill, 1997); El Shamsy, *The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History*.

⁸ Melchert, *The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries C.E.*

⁹ El Shamsy, *The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History*.

¹⁰ Weiss, *The Spirit of Islamic Law*; Vishanoff, *The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law*; Gleave, *Islam and Literalism: Literal Meaning and Interpretation in Islamic Legal Theory*; Zysow, *The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory*.

¹¹ Behnam Sadeghi, *The Logic of Law Making in Islam: Women and Prayer in the Legal Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

interpretation and inherited juristic reasoning. Ünver argues that the practice of the Prophet's Companions played a significant role in Ḥanafī *uṣūl al-fiqh*,¹² functioning as a proof for a range of theoretical principles. This is crucial because it indicates that Ḥanafī legal reasoning integrated textual authority with the practical authority of the earliest Muslim community. Çöklü, in discussing the classification of texts into *muhkam* and *mutashābih* and the contribution of figures such as Dabūsī,¹³ further shows that Ḥanafī legal theory developed sophisticated methods for managing clarity, ambiguity, and interpretive uncertainty. These insights are directly relevant to al-Jaṣṣāṣ, whose legal exegesis repeatedly depends on distinguishing between clear and indeterminate language, between textual generality and specification, and between the apparent meaning of a verse and the juristic procedure required to stabilize its legal force.

Despite these important contributions, the existing literature still leaves a significant gap regarding al-Jaṣṣāṣ's *Ahkām al-Qur'an*. Conceptually, many discussions of legal exegesis treat *Ahkām al-Qur'an* primarily as a genre of juridical *tafsīr*, but they do not sufficiently theorize how Qur'anic textual authority is constructed through the interaction of language, legal theory, prophetic practice, and madhhab-based argument. Methodologically, studies of al-Jaṣṣāṣ often identify his reliance on the *Qur'an*, *Sunnah*, Arabic language, and Ḥanafī doctrine, yet they rarely reconstruct the internal logic by which these elements are arranged hierarchically as proofs. Empirically and interpretively, his argumentative practice in selected legal passages remains underexplored as a concrete site where Qur'anic wording is converted into authoritative juristic doctrine. Without examining this mechanism of authorization, the study of *Ahkām al-Qur'an* risks remaining descriptive: it can show that al-Jaṣṣāṣ was a Ḥanafī exegete, but not how his Ḥanafī legal hermeneutic worked.

This gap is also significant for broader debates on Islamic legal hermeneutics. Contemporary approaches continue to revisit the relation between revelation, reason, and changing realities. Wardiono's Noetic Triadic Spiral Model, for example, proposes a dynamic framework that integrates revelation, reason, and empirical reality in legal reasoning.¹⁴ Although the present article is historical rather than constructive or reformist, such contemporary models demonstrate the continuing relevance of the classical problem examined here: how legal authority is generated through the interaction of text, reason, and interpretive procedure. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's work offers an early and highly developed Ḥanafī instance of this problem, not because he anticipates modern legal theory, but because his exegetical practice shows how classical jurists organized revelation, language, report, analogy, and juristic disagreement into a coherent structure of proof.

This article addresses the gap by examining *Ahkām al-Qur'an* as a work of legal hermeneutics rather than merely a commentary on legal verses. It asks three research questions: first, how does al-Jaṣṣāṣ construct the *Qur'an* as an authoritative legal proof in *Ahkām al-Qur'an*? Second, how does he use linguistic categories such as command, prohibition, generality, specification, implication, clarification, and ambiguity to transform Qur'anic wording into juristic doctrine? Third, how does Ḥanafī legal theory shape his hierarchy of proof, particularly in relation to *Qur'an*, *hadith*, *qiyās*, *ijmā'*, *'amal al-ṣahābah*, and intra-*madhhab* polemic? Correspondingly, the article aims to analyze the mechanisms

¹² A N Ünver, "The Role of The Practice of The Companions in Establishing The Ḥanafī Uṣūl Thought: Al-Sarakhsī as a Case Study," *Cumhuriyet İlahiyat Dergisi* 25, no. 3 (2021): 1359–79, <https://doi.org/10.18505/cuid.880702>.

¹³ R Çöklü, "The Semantic Transformation of the Concepts of Muhkam and Mutashābih in the Hanafī School of Jurisprudence From The Al-Uṣūl to The Al-Furū: An Examination in the Context of Dabūsī's Influence and Contribution," *Hittit Theology Journal* 24, no. 2 (2025): 955–73, <https://doi.org/10.14395/hid.1751020>.

¹⁴ K Wardiono et al., "Reconstructing Contemporary Legal Methodology through the Noetic Triadic Spiral Model: A Trans-Epistemological Perspective," *MILRev: Metro Islamic Law Review* 5, no. 1 (2026): 533–74, <https://doi.org/10.32332/milrev.v5i1.13039>.

through which al-Jaṣṣāṣ authorizes Qur'anic verses as legal proof, to examine the role of linguistic categories in his derivation of legal meaning, and to explain how Ḥanafī *uṣūl al-fiqh* structures his juristic argumentation.

The theoretical framework of the article combines Islamic legal hermeneutics, textual authority, and Ḥanafī *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Islamic legal hermeneutics is used to examine how revealed language is interpreted as law; textual authority explains how a text becomes normatively binding through recognized interpretive procedures; and Ḥanafī *uṣūl al-fiqh* provides the internal conceptual vocabulary needed to understand al-Jaṣṣāṣ's reasoning on its own terms. This framework is necessary because al-Jaṣṣāṣ cannot be adequately read through modern legal categories alone. His reasoning belongs to a classical *uṣūlī* universe in which legal meaning is produced through the relation between *lafẓ*, *dalālah*, *khabar*, *bayān*, *qiyās*, *ijmā'*, companion practice, and madhhab-based argumentation. In this sense, *Ahkām al-Qur'an* is treated not simply as a *tafsīr* text, but as an applied laboratory of Ḥanafī legal theory.

The novelty of this article lies in its argument that al-Jaṣṣāṣ's *Ahkām al-Qur'an* does not merely derive legal rulings from Qur'anic verses; it constructs the Qur'an as legal proof through a layered hermeneutical procedure. This procedure integrates linguistic analysis, Ḥanafī *uṣūl*, selective engagement with prophetic reports, attention to companion practice, analogical reasoning, and polemical argument against competing juristic positions. By foregrounding this mechanism, the article contributes to three fields of scholarship: the study of Qur'anic legal exegesis, the history of Ḥanafī legal reasoning, and the theory of textual authority in Islamic law. It proposes that al-Jaṣṣāṣ should be read not only as a Ḥanafī exegete, but as a theorist of Qur'anic legal meaning whose work demonstrates how scripture becomes law through disciplined juristic interpretation.

Method

This study employs a qualitative library-based textual research design using document analysis, qualitative content analysis, and legal-hermeneutical interpretation. This approach is appropriate because the study examines not numerical data, but the structure of meaning, argumentation, and legal reasoning in classical Islamic legal texts. Following Creswell and Poth's view that qualitative inquiry seeks to understand meaning, process, and interpretation within specific textual and historical contexts, this study analyzes how al-Jaṣṣāṣ constructs Qur'anic verses as authoritative legal proofs in *Ahkām al-Qur'an*.¹⁵

The primary data consist of two works by Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn 'Alī al-Rāzī al-Jaṣṣāṣ: *Ahkām al-Qur'an* and *al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl*. *Ahkām al-Qur'an* serves as the main corpus because it presents al-Jaṣṣāṣ's applied legal exegesis of Qur'anic verses, while *al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl* functions as an internal theoretical reference for identifying the *uṣūlī* principles underlying his interpretation, including *'amm*, *khāṣṣ*, *mujmal*, *bayān*, *amr*, *nahy*, *khabar*, *ijmā'*, *qiyās*, and *istihsān*. Secondary data include modern scholarship on Islamic legal theory, legal hermeneutics, Ḥanafī jurisprudence, textual authority, and Sunni legal schools, especially the works of Hallaq, Weiss, Vishanoff, Gleave, El Shamsy, Sadeghi, Melchert, Calder, and Zysow.¹⁶

¹⁵ Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*, Sage Publi, 2014.

¹⁶ Hallaq, *A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul Al-Fiqh*; Weiss, *The Spirit of Islamic Law*; Vishanoff, *The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law*; Gleave, *Islam and Literalism: Literal Meaning and Interpretation in Islamic Legal Theory*; El Shamsy, *The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History*; Sadeghi, *The Logic of Law Making in Islam: Women and Prayer in the Legal Tradition*; Melchert, *The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries C.E.*; Norman Calder, *Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Zysow, *The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory*.

Data were collected through purposive textual sampling. Selected passages were chosen based on four criteria: they involve Qur'anic legal interpretation; they contain explicit linguistic, *uṣūlī*, or juristic reasoning; they show interaction between Qur'anic wording and other legal proofs such as sunnah, khabar, *ijmā'*, *qiyās*, or *madhhab* disagreement; and they are relevant for explaining how Qur'anic textual authority is constructed. Based on these criteria, the study prioritizes al-Jaṣṣāṣ's interpretation of QS al-Mā'idah [5]:6 on *wudū'*, especially his discussion of *bi-ru'ūsikum*, *wa-arjulakum*, *qirā'ah* variation, *mujmal*, *bayān*, and prophetic practice.

The data collection process followed three stages. First, relevant legal passages in *Ahkām al-Qur'an* were identified through close reading. Second, related theoretical categories in *al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl* were traced to clarify the *uṣūlī* foundations of al-Jaṣṣāṣ's exegesis. Third, the selected passages were compared with modern scholarship on Islamic legal hermeneutics and Ḥanafī legal theory. This procedure follows Bowen's model of document analysis, which treats documents as legitimate qualitative data requiring systematic selection, interpretation, and evaluation.¹⁷

The analysis uses qualitative content analysis in Krippendorff's sense: a method for producing valid and replicable inferences from texts to their contexts of use.¹⁸ The coding was conducted thematically through four categories: textual authority, linguistic reasoning, hierarchy of proof, and juristic argumentation. These categories were derived deductively from the theoretical framework but applied inductively to the primary texts, allowing the analysis to remain grounded in al-Jaṣṣāṣ's own argumentative practice.

The interpretive framework combines Islamic legal hermeneutics and classical *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Hermeneutics is used as a disciplined approach to understanding how legal meaning is produced through interpretation, while *uṣūl al-fiqh* provides the internal conceptual vocabulary of classical Islamic legal reasoning. Gadamer's insight that understanding is historically situated and mediated through tradition is useful here, but the analysis does not impose philosophical hermeneutics externally; rather, it grounds interpretation in Islamic legal categories and the Ḥanafī *uṣūlī* tradition.¹⁹

To ensure methodological transparency, the study applies source triangulation by reading *Ahkām al-Qur'an* together with *al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl*, conceptual triangulation by comparing findings with modern scholarship, and textual traceability by citing primary passages directly and quoting Arabic where necessary. Ethical approval was not required because the study does not involve human participants, interviews, private data, or field observation. Nevertheless, academic integrity is maintained through accurate citation, careful transliteration, and clear distinction between primary textual evidence and the researcher's interpretation. Thus, the method allows the study to reconstruct how al-Jaṣṣāṣ builds Qur'anic legal authority through language, *uṣūlī* reasoning, and juristic argument in a transparent and replicable manner.

Results and Discussion

Qur'anic Text as Legal Proof: From Scriptural Wording to Normative Authority

The principal finding of this study is that al-Jaṣṣāṣ does not treat Qur'anic legal verses as self-executing normative statements, but as authoritative textual proofs whose legal force must be activated through *uṣūlī* reasoning, linguistic classification, prophetic clarification, and Ḥanafī juristic argumentation. In *Ahkām al-Qur'an*, the authority of the *Qur'an* lies not only in its revealed status, but also in the interpretive procedures through which its wording is identified, delimited, clarified, extended, or restricted as law. This

¹⁷ Glenn A Bowen, "Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method," *Qualitative Research Journal* 9, no. 2 (2009): 27–40.

¹⁸ Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology* (Sage Publications, 2018).

¹⁹ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1975).

finding complicates any simple opposition between “scripture” and “juristic construction”: for al-Jaṣṣāṣ, the Qur'an becomes a binding *dalil shar'i* precisely through a disciplined hermeneutical process that links *lafz*, *dalālah*, *sunnah*, *ijmā'*, *qiyās*, and Ḥanafī legal reasoning.

The strongest primary evidence for this claim appears in al-Jaṣṣāṣ's own formulation of the purpose of *uṣūl al-fiqh* in *al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl*. At the beginning of the work, he defines the field as concerned with “طُرُق اسْتِنْبَاطِ مَعَانِي الْقُرْآنِ، وَاسْتِخْرَاجِ دَلَالَتِهِ، وَأَحْكَامِ أَلْفَاطِهِ”—that is, “methods for deriving the meanings of the *Qur'an*, extracting its proofs, and determining the legal force of its expressions”.²⁰ This statement is methodologically decisive. It shows that, for al-Jaṣṣāṣ, legal engagement with the *Qur'an* involves at least three interrelated operations: *istinbat al-ma'āni*, the derivation of meanings; *istikebrāj al-dalā'il*, the extraction of proofs; and *aḥkām al-alfāz*, the determination of the legal implications of expressions. Legal meaning is therefore not produced by unmediated literal reading, but through a technical process in which language is made legally operative.

This structure is not merely theoretical; it appears repeatedly in *Aḥkām al-Qur'an*. When interpreting QS al-Mā'idah [5]:6 on *wuḍū'*, al-Jaṣṣāṣ does not simply restate the ritual obligation of washing or wiping the relevant limbs. He examines whether the Qur'anic wording is determinate or indeterminate, whether a phrase is *mujmal*, whether prophetic practice functions as *bayān*, and how the legal scope of the verse is stabilized through interpretive evidence. In his discussion of the phrase *bi-ru'ūsikum*, he argues that if the part of the head to be wiped is not specified, the expression must be treated as legally indeterminate: “فَإِنَّ ذَلِكَ أَلْبَعْضَ لَمَّا كَانَ مَجْهُولًا عِنْدَنَا وَجَبَ أَنْ يَكُونَ مُجْمَلًا مَوْقُوفَ الْحُكْمِ عَلَى الْبَيَانِ”—“because that part is unknown to us, it must be regarded as *mujmal*, whose ruling depends on clarification”.²¹ The verse is authoritative, but its operative legal meaning depends on identifying the status of its expression and the kind of clarification required.

This finding is important because it reveals a procedural model of textual authority. The Qur'anic text does not lose authority because it requires interpretation; rather, its authority is juridically secured through recognized methods of interpretation. This point resonates with broader studies of textual authority in Islamic law, which show that authority is rooted in the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* as primary sources but becomes legally effective through semantic organization, codification, and interpretive structuring.²² Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's practice also suggests that textual authority is not an abstract quality attached to a text in isolation. It emerges through practices that orient communities toward texts and enable those texts to function intelligibly within concrete contexts, a point that Nieber develops in relation to the material and symbolic force of Qur'anic textuality.²³ In al-Jaṣṣāṣ's case, the relevant context is not devotional healing but juristic reasoning; nevertheless, the underlying principle is similar: textual authority is produced through practices of orientation, use, and interpretation.

Table 1. summarizes the primary textual evidence and its analytical significance:

Primary textual locus	Key concept	Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's interpretive move	Analytical implication

²⁰ Ahmad ibn Ali al-Razi al-Jassas, *Abkam Al-Qur'an*, ed. Muhammad Sadiq al-Qamhawi, *Abkam Al-Qur'an*, vol. 1–3 (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1994).

²¹ al-Jassas.

²² O A Al Anbar, “The Role of Structural Linguistic Criticism in the Interpretation of the Text Codification,” *Dirasat: Human and Social Sciences* 40, no. 2 (2013): 239–50, <https://doi.org/10.12816/0007782>; A Osman, “The Qur'an and the Hadith as Sources of Islamic Law,” in *Routledge Handbook of Islamic Law*, 2019, 127–40, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315753881-8>.

²³ H Nieber, “Authority with Textual Materials—Power of the Written Qur'an,” *Material Religion* 20, no. 1 (2024): 51–72, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17432200.2024.2303905>.

<i>al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl</i> , I:40	<i>Istinbāt, dalā'il, aḥkām al-alfāz</i>	Defines <i>uṣūl</i> as the discipline of deriving Qur'anic meanings, extracting proofs, and determining the legal force of expressions	Qur'anic legal authority is procedural, not merely declarative
<i>Aḥkām al-Qur'an</i> , II:431	<i>Mujmal</i> and <i>bayān</i>	Treats unspecified wording in QS 5:6 as dependent on clarification	Legal meaning requires classification of textual determinacy
<i>Aḥkām al-Qur'an</i> , II:431	Prophetic clarification	Uses <i>bayān</i> to stabilize the legal meaning of Qur'anic wording	Sunnah functions as interpretive clarification, not as displacement of Qur'anic authority
<i>Aḥkām al-Qur'an</i> , II:431–438	<i>Lafẓ, dalālah, juristic disagreement</i>	Moves from wording to legal doctrine through linguistic and juristic analysis	<i>Tafsīr</i> becomes an applied practice of Ḥanafī <i>uṣūl</i>

This procedural understanding also distinguishes al-Jaṣṣāṣ's approach from forms of literalism that collapse textual authority into immediate textual access. Tabti, in discussing neo-Salafi orientations to textual authority, notes the tendency to privilege literal readings as charismatic access to “authentic” religion. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's method is fundamentally different. Although he treats the *Qur'an* as the highest legal source, he does not assume that legal validity is guaranteed by literal citation alone. The text must be processed through categories of *lafẓ, dalālah, mujmal, bayān*, and juristic hierarchy.²⁴ His approach is therefore textualist in the sense that it is anchored in revelation, but not literalist in the sense of bypassing legal theory.

The distinction is also necessary when comparing classical *dalīl* with modern discussions of legal proof. Contemporary studies of Islamic evidence law often use “proof” to refer to procedural mechanisms in adjudication, including testimony, oaths, forensic evidence, DNA testing, and standards of proof in criminal or civil contexts.²⁵ Other studies examine *yaqīn* and *ẓann al-ghālib* in evidentiary standards, especially in hudud and criminal proceedings,²⁶ or discuss reverse burden of proof in corruption and money-laundering cases.²⁷ These modern debates are important, but the present study uses “legal proof” in a different, *uṣūlī* sense: not as courtroom evidence for establishing facts, but as *dalīl* for deriving norms from revelation. The comparison is analytically useful because both fields

²⁴ S Tabti, “The Charisma of Script: The Quran and the Hadith in Neo-Salafi Online Community,” *Journal of Religion in Europe* 12, no. 2 (2020): 191–216, <https://doi.org/10.1163/18748929-01202005>.

²⁵ A B Mohamad and N Ismail, “Role of Forensic Evidence in Upholding Justice: Exploring Islamic Law and the Experience of Syariah Courts in Malaysia,” *Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities* 29, no. 2 (2021): 1091–1104, <https://doi.org/10.47836/pjssh.29.2.19>; L A Mutalib et al., “Al-Qarinah (Circumstantial Evidence) and Its Capacity in Criminal Cases, Munakahat and Wealth Convictions According to Islam,” *International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology* 29, no. 3 (2020): 1016–26, <https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85081190890&partnerID=40&md5=84914c5c9a9a5b3cb47bb8fa03f7dc47>; A Acar and M B Dadaş, “Scientific Studies on Proof and Refutation of Progeny by Dna Test in Turkey and Their Evaluation,” *Cumburiyet İlahiyat Dergisi* 29, no. 2 (2025): 310–32, <https://doi.org/10.18505/cuid.1742559>.

²⁶ S Saifuddin, “Analysis of Applied the Standard of Proof for Hudud Offences under the Syariah Criminal Enactment in Malaysia,” *Journal of Shari'ah Law Research* 6, no. 1 (2021): 89–108, <https://doi.org/10.22452/jslr.vol6no1.6>; S Saifuddin et al., “Examining The Application Of Standard Of Proof In Criminal Cases: A Comparative Analysis Of Islamic Law And Common Law In Malaysia,” *Malaysian Journal of Syariah and Law* 12, no. 1 (2024): 11–22, <https://doi.org/10.33102/mjsl.vol12no1.491>.

²⁷ A Sitompul, A Kartika, and W S Wahyuni, “Money Laundering Crime In The Perspective Of Islamic Law In The System Of Proof,” *Justicia Islamica* 19, no. 2 (2022): 279–98, <https://doi.org/10.21154/justicia.v19i2.3744>; A H Prayitno et al., “Reversed Burden of Proof in the Procedural Law of Corruption Cases: A Normative Study of Justice and Legal Certainty in Positive and Islamic Law,” *Jurnal Ilmiah Mizani* 12, no. 1 (2025): 376–91, <https://doi.org/10.29300/mzn.v12i1.8182>; G Ahmad et al., “Principles of Reversal Burden of Proof in the Perspective of Indonesian Criminal Law and Islamic Law,” *Jurnal Hukum Islam* 20, no. 2 (2022): 355–78, <https://doi.org/10.28918/jhi.v20i2.6749>.

are concerned with validity, certainty, and justification; however, al-Jaṣṣāṣ's concern is primarily hermeneutical and epistemological rather than forensic or procedural.

The same distinction applies to *istinbāt*. Contemporary scholarship often presents *istinbāt* as a dynamic method for deriving rulings from the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* through *qiyās*, *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*, social context, and adaptive legal reasoning.²⁸ Other studies emphasize the need to integrate local wisdom and contextual considerations in contemporary legal derivation.²⁹ Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's model is not identical to these modern reformist applications, yet it provides an early example of the same broader problem: how legal meaning can be derived without severing the connection between textual fidelity and juristic reasoning. His use of *istinbāt* is rooted in classical Ḥanafī *uṣūl*, but it already shows that legal derivation is neither mechanical nor arbitrary. It is constrained by language, proof hierarchy, transmitted clarification, and juristic method.

Language is central to this process. The additional literature on *istinbāt* and *dalālah* helps clarify why al-Jaṣṣāṣ gives so much attention to *lafẓ* and textual determinacy. Muslim argues that mastery of Arabic is indispensable for credible legal derivation because linguistic competence enables jurists to interpret revealed texts accurately.³⁰ Similarly, Çalişkan emphasizes that *dalālah* in *uṣūl al-fiqh* depends on classifying words and meanings such as *muhkam*, *mutashabih*, and *zahir*—to resolve ambiguity and regulate interpretation.³¹ Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's treatment of *bi-ru'ūsikum* reflects precisely this logic. He does not ask only what the phrase means lexically; he asks what kind of legal indication it produces, whether it is sufficiently determinate, and what kind of *bayān* is needed to render it legally operative.

The Ḥanafī character of this reasoning becomes clearer when read considering studies on companion practice and proof formation. Ünver shows that the practices of the Prophet's Companions served as evidence for establishing principles of *dalālah* in Ḥanafī legal theory.³² This matters for al-Jaṣṣāṣ because his hermeneutic does not reduce legal authority to isolated scriptural wording; it operates within a wider proof ecology that includes transmitted practice, juristic precedent, and the epistemic authority of the early Muslim community. His method therefore confirms Soufi's view that *uṣūl al-fiqh* provides an epistemological foundation for deriving rulings while maintaining consistency in legal reasoning.³³ At the same time, it anticipates the kind of balance between textual fidelity and contextual flexibility that Channak identifies as crucial to the continuing relevance of *uṣūl al-fiqh* in responding to socio-political change.³⁴

Critically, this finding supports Hallaq's claim that *uṣūl al-fiqh* regulates the relationship between revelation and law through theories of proof, language, and inference,

²⁸ A Yağın, "Yūsuf Al-Qarḍāwī's *Istinbāt* Method and Its Implementation in the Moderation of Islamic Law," *Al-Ahkam* 31, no. 1 (2021): 109–40, <https://doi.org/10.21580/ahkam.2021.31.1.7075>; I Syaf'i et al., "Harmonization of Islamic Law and Local Wisdom: A Methodological Reconstruction of *Ijtihad* in Family Law Based on Yusuf Al-Qaradawi's *Istinbāt* Approach," *Nusantara: Journal of Law Studies* 5, no. 1 (2026): 25–43, <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18359276>.

²⁹ M H M Azhar et al., "Ethics and Limits of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Quranic Exegesis According to the Epistemological Framework of Islamic Knowledge," *Quranica* 17, no. 2 (2025): 97–124, <https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-105018233406&partnerID=40&md5=2b4db6dfe95e93ec70f563c9c3f2d622>.

³⁰ B Muslim et al., "The Arabic Language Contribution to the *Istinbāt* in Islamic Law of Acehese Scholars," *Samarah* 6, no. 1 (2022): 224–43, <https://doi.org/10.22373/SJHK.V6I1.11732>.

³¹ K Çalişkan, "Types of Words (*Alfāz*) in Abū Bakr Al-Jassās' Approach to the Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (*Uṣūl Al-Fiqh*) and a Suggestion for a Diagrammatic Division," *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 63, no. 2 (2022): 607–715, <https://doi.org/10.33227/auifd.1052293>.

³² Ünver, "The Role of The Practice of The Companions in Establishing The Ḥanafī Uṣūl Thought: Al-Sarakhsi as a Case Study."

³³ Y L Soufi, "Why Study *Uṣūl Al-Fiqh*? The Problem of *Taqīd* and Tough Cases in 4th-5th /10th-11th Century Iraq," *Islamic Law and Society* 28, no. 1–2 (2021): 1–31, <https://doi.org/10.1163/15685195-BJA10006>.

³⁴ Z M O Channak and Y J Amuda, "Legitimacy And Legitimation: A Comparative Analysis Of Islamic Law And European Standards Through The Lens Of Sdg 16," *Access to Justice in Eastern Europe* 9, no. 1 (2026): 263–91, <https://doi.org/10.33327/AJEE-18-9.1-a000180>.

but it also refines that claim by showing how such regulation operates inside legal exegesis itself. *Uṣūl* is not merely an abstract theoretical discipline standing behind *tafsīr*; in al-Jaṣṣāṣ's *Ahkām al-Qur'an*, it becomes an exegetical practice. Likewise, while Vishanoff emphasizes the formation of Sunni hermeneutics through theories of language and revelation, al-Jaṣṣāṣ supplies a concrete Ḥanafī case in which those theories are enacted through the interpretation of specific legal verses.³⁵ The evidence from QS al-Mā'idah [5]:6 shows that Qur'anic legal meaning is produced through classification, clarification, and proof-ordering, not through citation alone.

The theoretical implication is that textual authority in *Ahkām al-Qur'an* is best understood as procedural authority. The Qur'an functions as the supreme source of law, but its legal normativity is made operative through a recognized system of interpretive acts. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ does not diminish revelation by subjecting it to legal theory; rather, he protects its legal authority from uncontrolled interpretation by embedding it in *uṣūlī* discipline. This makes *Ahkām al-Qur'an* more than a collection of legal interpretations. It is an applied demonstration of how a jurist converts scriptural wording into normative authority through the combined force of language, proof, and madhhab-based reasoning.

Language as Juristic Evidence: *Lafz*, *Mujmal*, *Bayān*, and the Production of Legal Meaning

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's analysis of Qur'anic language demonstrates that, in Ḥanafī legal exegesis, language is not a neutral vehicle of revelation but an evidence-bearing structure through which legal normativity is produced, limited, and authorized. The conceptual significance of this finding lies in the fact that al-Jaṣṣāṣ does not treat *lafz* merely as wording to be translated into law; rather, he treats it as a juridical site where determinacy, ambiguity, grammatical relation, transmitted clarification, and legal consequence are negotiated. This confirms the centrality of *lafz* in Islamic legal interpretation, where rulings depend on the exact wording of the Qur'an and Sunnah and on the jurist's capacity to clarify ambiguity through disciplined methods.³⁶ It also resonates with broader legal theory, which recognizes that linguistic indeterminacy can generate divergent legal interpretations when legal terms lack sufficient precision.

This linguistic-juristic logic is particularly visible in al-Jaṣṣāṣ's treatment of QS al-Mā'idah [5]:6. In discussing *bi-ru'ūsikum*, he argues that the legal problem arises because the phrase may indicate wiping part of the head, but the specific part remains unspecified. For this reason, he classifies the expression as *mujmal* and states that its ruling is *mauqūf al-ḥukm 'alā al-bayān*, dependent on clarification.³⁷ The importance of this move is conceptual rather than merely exegetical. By identifying the phrase as *mujmal*, al-Jaṣṣāṣ shifts the problem from lexical meaning to legal determinacy. The question is no longer simply what the phrase can mean linguistically, but what degree of semantic precision is required before the text can generate an enforceable ruling. This supports recent discussions of *mujmal* as a category that requires interpretive tools such as *ijtihād* and *qiyās* to uncover intended legal meanings,³⁸ while also showing that al-Jaṣṣāṣ anchors such tools within a hierarchy of textual clarification.

His use of *bayān* further refines this point. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ writes: “فَمَا وَرَدَ عَنِ النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ مِنْ فِعْلٍ فِيهِ فَهُوَ بَيَانٌ مُرَادُ اللَّهِ” “Whatever is transmitted from the Prophet's action concerning

³⁵ Vishanoff, *The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law*.

³⁶ S Kumaz, “Who Is the Lawgiver? The Hermeneutical Grounds of the Methods of Interpreting Qur'an and Sunna (Istinbat Al-Ahkam),” *Oxford Journal of Law and Religion* 6, no. 2 (2017): 347–71, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ojlr/rwx007>.

³⁷ al-Jassas, *Ahkām Al-Qur'an*.

³⁸ M Iqbal, “A General View of Qiyās: A Dialectical Reading,” in *Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning*, vol. 25, 2022, 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91676-3_1.

it is a clarification of God's intent".³⁹ Here, the Sunnah does not compete with the Qur'an as an external authority; it functions as the communicative completion of Qur'anic indication. This is consistent with Kurnaz's account of *bayān* as a methodological tool within *uṣūl al-fiqh* for clarifying ambiguous texts and producing valid legal rules.⁴⁰ Yet al-Jaṣṣāṣ's formulation adds a sharper theological-juristic dimension: *bayān* is not merely clarification by a scholar, but the disclosure of *murād Allāh* through prophetic practice. The scholar's task is therefore not to invent meaning, but to identify the authoritative route by which divine intent becomes legally intelligible.

The second case, *wa arjulakum*, shows that al-Jaṣṣāṣ's legal hermeneutic does not reduce language to a single literal plane. He notes that both the accusative and genitive readings were transmitted as Qur'an: “وَهَاتَانِ الْفُرَاتَانِ قَدْ نَزَلَ بِهِمَا الْقُرْآنُ جَمِيعًا وَنَقَلْتَهُمَا الْأُمَّةُ تَلْفِيًا” —“Both readings were revealed as *Qur'an*, and the community transmitted them by reception from the Messenger of God”. He then treats each reading as legally meaningful, exploring whether the accusative implies washing through an implied verb, whether it can be connected to the meaning of wiping, and whether the genitive reading indicates conjunction with the head or grammatical proximity.⁴¹ This analysis illustrates that *qirā'ah* variation is not ornamental; it shapes the grammar of legal possibility. Mustopa's argument that *qirā'ah* variation can influence legal interpretation and generate diverse legal applications, including in family-law contexts, is therefore conceptually relevant beyond its specific field of application. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ offers an earlier juristic model in which recitational plurality is absorbed into legal reasoning rather than dismissed as textual instability.

These findings refine Gleave's argument that literal meaning in Islamic legal theory is neither simple nor uncontested.⁴² Al-Jaṣṣāṣ confirms that legal literalism is not reducible to surface wording, because *lafz* becomes legally effective only through *dalālah*, grammatical relation, transmitted clarification, and juristic assessment. His approach also complicates modern assumptions that ambiguity necessarily requires broad purposive reasoning. Contemporary discussions often emphasize *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* as a means of balancing textual fidelity with wider social benefit.⁴³ Al-Jaṣṣāṣ does not formulate the issue in modern *maqāṣid* terms, but his treatment of *mujmal* shows that legal interpretation already requires a balance between fidelity to the wording and the need for legally functional meaning. Where contemporary approaches may move from ambiguity to public interest, al-Jaṣṣāṣ moves from ambiguity to *bayān*, *qirā'ah*, *qiyās*, and *madhhab*-based reasoning. The difference is important: his hermeneutic expands meaning through legal method, not through unrestricted purposive discretion.

The broader implication is that al-Jaṣṣāṣ's hermeneutics should be understood as linguistic-juristic rather than linguistic-formalist. He does not analyze language for philological completeness alone. He examines *lafz*, *mujmal*, *bayān*, *qirā'ah*, *i'rab*, and *'atf* because each determines the conditions under which Qur'anic wording may become law. This also speaks to Bilgili's observation that early Islamic legal terminology developed with

³⁹ Abu Bakr Ahmad ibn Ali Al-Jassas, *Abkam Al-Qur'an* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1994).

⁴⁰ Kurnaz, “Who Is the Lawgiver? The Hermeneutical Grounds of the Methods of Interpreting Qur'an and Sunna (Istinbat Al-Ahkam).”

⁴¹ al-Jassas, *Abkam Al-Qur'an*.

⁴² Gleave, *Islam and Literalism: Literal Meaning and Interpretation in Islamic Legal Theory*.

⁴³ M Ainur Rifqi and A Halil Thahir, “Maqasidi Interpretation; Building Interpretation Paradigm Based on Mashlahah,” *Millah: Journal of Religious Studies* 18, no. 2 (2019): 335–56, <https://doi.org/10.20885/millah.vol18.iss2.art7>; O Abdoul-Hamid, W Mohd Yusof Wan Chik, and A Iqbal Mohd Fadzli, “Implicit Memory As The Foundation Of Motor Intelligence In University Students,” *Journal of Fatwa Management and Research* 31, no. 1 (2026): 261–88, <https://doi.org/10.33102/jfatwa.vol31no1.755>.

a degree of flexibility before full systematic codification.⁴⁴ Al-Jaṣṣāṣ stands at a stage where linguistic flexibility is increasingly disciplined by *uṣūlī* categories, allowing interpretive plurality to be managed rather than eliminated. His method therefore bridges textual source and practical ruling through controlled interpretive tools, the same mediating function attributed to *qiyās* and *ijtihād* in modern discussions of ambiguous texts.⁴⁵ This sub-section shows that language in *Ahkām al-Qur'an* is not merely the starting point of legal reasoning; it is the medium through which authority, ambiguity, clarification, and normativity are organized. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's contribution lies in demonstrating that Qur'anic legal meaning is produced neither by bare literalism nor by free rational construction, but by a linguistic-juristic procedure in which wording becomes law through structured proof.

Sunnah, Khabar, and the Hierarchy of Proof: Clarification without Displacing the Qur'an

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's treatment of *sunnah*, *khabar*, and *atsar* confirms the centrality of transmitted evidence in Islamic legal reasoning, but it also complicates any binary account that contrasts Ḥanafī rationalism with textual authority. His method shows that *sunnah* does not compete with the *Qur'an* as an autonomous source detached from revelation; rather, it functions as an epistemic and hermeneutical mechanism that clarifies, qualifies, or confirms Qur'anic legal meaning. This finding corresponds with the broader *Sunni* hierarchy of legal sources, in which the *Qur'an* holds the highest authority and the *Sunnah* follows as the second primary source of law.⁴⁶ Yet al-Jaṣṣāṣ's contribution lies in showing how this hierarchy operates in exegetical practice, not merely as a theoretical ordering of sources.

Previous scholarship has long recognized the legal significance of the *Sunnah* as the Prophet's sayings, actions, and tacit approvals, conventionally classified into *qawlī*, *fi'lī*, and *taqrīrī* forms.⁴⁷ Nasr and Mahmood further emphasize that the *Sunnah* complements the *Qur'an* by embodying divine guidance in lived practice and sacralizing human conduct.⁴⁸ Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's discussion of *wudū'* in *Ahkām al-Qur'an* confirms this general claim, but with greater juristic precision. When he states that the Prophet's action concerning the ambiguous element of the verse constitutes *bayān* of God's intent, he does not simply appeal to *Sunnah* as an additional authority; he defines its legal function as clarification of Qur'anic meaning.⁴⁹ In this respect, his position aligns with Kurnaz's understanding of *bayān* as a central tool by which hadith elucidates Qur'anic texts and enables the derivation of legal rulings.⁵⁰ However, al-Jaṣṣāṣ's formulation is more restrictive than a general

⁴⁴ İ Bilgili and İ Karagözoğlu, "Imām Muḥammad's Use of the Phrases Yanbaghī and Lā Yanbaghī in Al-Muwatta' Pertaining to Taklīfī Rulings," *Mutefekkir* 12, no. 24 (2025): 395–411, <https://doi.org/10.30523/mutefekkir.1779986>.

⁴⁵ Iqbal, "A General View of Qiyās: A Dialectical Reading"; Abdoul-Hamid, Mohd Yusof Wan Chik, and Iqbal Mohd Fadzli, "Implicit Memory As The Foundation Of Motor Intelligence In University Students."

⁴⁶ S Yılmaz and M F Yalçın, "Scholarship and Social Life of Women in the Period of Mamlūks: With Special Attention to Najm Al-Dīn Ibn Fahd's Teachers," *Cumhuriyet İlahiyat Dergisi* 25, no. 1 (2021): 455–77, <https://doi.org/10.18505/cuid.912983>; D V Lukianov, H P Ponomarova, and A S Tahiev, "The Quran in Shia Jurisprudence," *Journal of the National Academy of Legal Sciences of Ukraine* 27, no. 4 (2020): 29–42, [https://doi.org/10.37635/jnalsu.27\(4\).2020.29-42](https://doi.org/10.37635/jnalsu.27(4).2020.29-42).

⁴⁷ M Sulaiman and O K Bhatti, "Workplace Deviance and Spirituality in Muslim Organizations," *Asian Social Science* 9, no. 10 (2013): 237–46, <https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v9n10p237>; Mehmet Asutay and Isa Yılmaz., "Constituting an Islamic Social Welfare Function: An Exploration through Islamic Moral Economy.," " *International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management*, 2020, 3–2019, <https://doi.org/10.1108/IMEFM-03-2019-0130>.

⁴⁸ S H Nasr, "The Life, Traditions, and Sayings of the Prophet: Sunnah and Hadith," in *Islamic Spirituality: Foundations: Volume 48*, vol. 48, 2013, 97–110, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315888200-8>; T Mahmood, "Law In The Qur'an-A Draft Code," in *Islamic Legal Theory: Volume 1*, vol. 1, 2017, 127–58, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315251721-15>.

⁴⁹ al-Jassas, *Ahkām Al-Qur'an*.

⁵⁰ Kurnaz, "Who Is the Lawgiver? The Hermeneutical Grounds of the Methods of Interpreting Qur'an and Sunna (Istinbat Al-Ahkām)."

complementarity model: *Sunnah* clarifies the *Qur'an* without displacing the *Qur'an's* primacy.

This point also clarifies the difference between Sunni and *Shi'i* understandings of transmitted authority. Ahmari notes that while Sunni Muslims restrict *Sunnah* to the Prophet, *Shi'i* traditions extend authoritative *Sunnah* to the Imams and Fāṭimah al-Zahrā'.⁵¹ Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's framework belongs firmly within the Sunni legal architecture: the Prophet's practice functions as *bayān* because of its direct relation to divine communication, whereas companion reports and juristic reasoning occupy derivative positions. This distinction matters because it prevents a flattening of transmitted authority. Not every inherited report has the same legal weight; each must be situated within an epistemic hierarchy.

This hierarchy is especially evident in al-Jaṣṣāṣ's treatment of *khabar aḥād*. In *al-Fuṣūl fi al-Uṣūl*, he writes: “إِنَّ أَحْبَابَ الْأَحَادِ عَلَى ضَرَبَيْنِ: أَحَدُهُمَا يُوجِبُ الْعِلْمَ لِمَا تَصَحَّحَهُ مِنَ الدَّلَالَةِ الْمُوجِبَةِ لِصِحَّتِهِ، وَالْآخَرُ لَا يُوجِبُ الْعِلْمَ بِصِحَّةِ مُخْبَرِهِ” —“Reports of single transmitters are of two types: one produces knowledge because it is accompanied by an indication requiring its authenticity; the other does not produce knowledge of the truth of its content”.⁵² This passage shows that al-Jaṣṣāṣ does not treat hadith reports as homogeneous evidentiary material. *Khabar* must be assessed according to its epistemic force, corroborating indications, and relation to stronger proofs. This confirms Kutluay's account of *khabar aḥād* as solitary reports that do not reach the level of *mutawātir* and whose legal authority has been debated because of questions of authenticity, transmission, and methodological reliability.⁵³ It also resonates with Maizuddin's discussion of the continuing methodological challenges posed by solitary reports in legal derivation.⁵⁴ Al-Jaṣṣāṣ thus provides an early Ḥanafī example of what later scholarship would describe as the problem of probabilistic evidence within legal epistemology.

At the same time, al-Jaṣṣāṣ's method challenges the tendency to describe the Ḥanafī school simply as a rationalist tradition that privileges *qiyās* over transmitted evidence. In his discussion of al-Mā'idah, the principle “*lā ḥaḥẓa li-l-naẓar ma'a al-atḥar*” there is no room for speculative reasoning when a transmitted report exists marks a clear limit on legal reasoning.⁵⁵ This does not mean that al-Jaṣṣāṣ rejects rational argument; rather, it means that *naẓar*, *qiyās*, and *istidlāl* are valid only within a hierarchy governed by stronger textual or transmitted proofs. Sadeghi's analysis of Ḥanafī law-making is helpful here because it shows that Ḥanafī reasoning cannot be reduced to a crude opposition between text and reason; it involves a layered logic of doctrine, values, inherited authority, and textual justification.⁵⁶ Al-Jaṣṣāṣ confirms this model but adds a more explicitly exegetical dimension: the hierarchy is not merely doctrinal but is enacted verse by verse in the interpretation of Qur'anic legal language.

The role of *atsar* further illustrates this point. *Atsar*, understood as the sayings or actions of the Companions, does not possess the same authority as the *Qur'an* or prophetic *Sunnah*, yet it often serves to complement or clarify legal meaning where direct prophetic

⁵¹ H Ahmari and S A Hosseini, “The Sunnah Argument and the Jurisconsults Words about It,” *Social Sciences (Pakistan)* 10, no. 7 (2015): 2017–20, <https://doi.org/10.3923/sscience.2015.2017.2020>.

⁵² Al-Jassas, *Aḥkam Al-Qur'an*.

⁵³ I Kutluay, “The Scope of the Sunna in Shāfi'i's Thought System,” *Energy Education Science and Technology Part B: Social and Educational Studies* 4, no. 1 (2012): 501–10, <https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84861137102&partnerID=40&md5=d9418dcfd802f5ba6a6cf7d9b72e58a3>.

⁵⁴ M Maizuddin et al., “The Typology of Hadith as the Bayan of the Qur'an and Its Implications for the Reform of Islamic Inheritance Law,” *Samarah* 7, no. 2 (2023): 760–80, <https://doi.org/10.22373/sjhk.v7i2.17467>.

⁵⁵ Al-Jassas, *Aḥkam Al-Qur'an*.

⁵⁶ Sadeghi, *The Logic of Law Making in Islam: Women and Prayer in the Legal Tradition*.

guidance is unavailable.⁵⁷ This helps explain why al-Jaṣṣāṣ's hierarchy is neither purely scriptural nor purely rational. It is a layered structure in which *Qur'an*, *Sunnah*, *atsar*, *ijmā'*, and *qiyās* each have distinct evidentiary functions. Baderin's account of Islamic legal sources similarly identifies *ijmā'*, *qiyās*, and other secondary sources as operating beneath the primary authority of *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*.⁵⁸ Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's significance lies in showing how these levels are coordinated in actual legal exegesis: transmitted clarification limits speculative reasoning, but it does not eliminate juristic analysis.

This finding refines Hallaq's broader account of *uṣūl al-fiqh* as the discipline that systematizes proof, inference, and legal authority.⁵⁹ Al-Jaṣṣāṣ demonstrates that *uṣūl* is not merely a list of sources but a theory of epistemic sequencing. The *Qur'an* remains the center of authority; *Sunnah* functions as *bayān*; *khabar* is evaluated according to its evidentiary strength; *atsar* constrains legal reasoning when sufficiently authoritative; and *qiyās* operates only where stronger textual or transmitted evidence does not determine the ruling. This structure also complicates modern *maqāṣid*-oriented discussions. Contemporary scholarship emphasizes *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* as a framework for ensuring that rulings align with ethical and social objectives.⁶⁰ Al-Jaṣṣāṣ does not articulate a modern *maqāṣid* theory, but his hierarchy of proof shows an analogous concern for disciplined legal justification: legal outcomes must not be produced by unconstrained reasoning, even when reason serves valid juristic ends.

The distinctive contribution of this study is therefore to position al-Jaṣṣāṣ between textual primacy and juristic reasoning without collapsing him into either pole. His *Ahkām al-Qur'an* should be read as a practical demonstration of hierarchy of proof: *Sunnah* clarifies the *Qur'an*, *khabar* is epistemically graded, *atsar* limits unsupported speculation, and *qiyās* functions within boundaries set by transmitted evidence. This places al-Jaṣṣāṣ within the broader discourse on Islamic legal hermeneutics as a jurist whose method preserves *Qur'anic* supremacy while making room for a sophisticated, disciplined architecture of proof.

Madhhab-Based Argumentation and the Authorization of Ḥanafī Legal Doctrine

The broader significance of al-Jaṣṣāṣ's *Ahkām al-Qur'an* lies in its demonstration that *Qur'anic* legal authority is not produced outside juristic tradition, but through the interpretive discipline of a *madhhab*. The findings of this study show that al-Jaṣṣāṣ does not merely interpret legal verses in a neutral exegetical register; he uses *Qur'anic* exegesis as a space in which Ḥanafī doctrine is authorized, defended, and methodologically grounded. This does not reduce *Ahkām al-Qur'an* to sectarian apologetics. Rather, it reveals how madhhab-based reasoning functions as an intellectual mechanism through which scriptural meaning becomes legally persuasive within a recognized interpretive community.

This has important implications for *Qur'anic* studies and Islamic legal studies. The standard view that legal exegesis derives rulings from verses must be refined: in al-Jaṣṣāṣ's case, legal *tafsīr* also constructs the authority of the juristic school itself. Many discussions in *Ahkām al-Qur'an* follow a recognizable argumentative sequence: *Qur'anic* verse,

⁵⁷ Maizuddin et al., "The Typology of Hadith as the Bayan of the Qur'an and Its Implications for the Reform of Islamic Inheritance Law."

⁵⁸ M A Baderin, *Islamic Legal Theory: Volume 1, Islamic Legal Theory: Volume 1*, vol. 1, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315251721>.

⁵⁹ Hallaq, *A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul Al-Fiqh*.

⁶⁰ A Duderija, "Islamic Law Reform and Maqāṣid Al-Sharī'a in the Thought of Mohammad Hashim Kamali," in *Maqāṣid Al-Sharī'a and Contemporary Reformist Muslim Thought: An Examination*, 2014, 13–37, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137319418_2; F A Al Munawar, "Abd Al-Majīd Al-Najjār's Perspective on Maqāṣid Al-Sharī'ah," *Juris: Jurnal Ilmiah Syariah* 20, no. 2 (2021): 209–23, <https://doi.org/10.31958/juris.v20i2.4281>; R Beka, "Maqāṣid and the Renewal of Islamic Legal Theory in 'Abdullah Bin Bayyah's Discourse," *American Journal of Islam and Society* 38, no. 3–4 (2021): 103–45, <https://doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v38i3-4.2987>.

linguistic analysis, presentation of juristic disagreement, defense of a preferred position, and assessment of opposing evidence. This pattern is visible in discussions of *wuḍū'*, marriage, divorce, *ribā*, inheritance, criminal law, and transactions. In the case of QS al-Mā'idah [5]:6, the discussion of wiping the head, washing the feet, and the Prophet's explanatory practice is not merely a technical ritual analysis; it becomes a field in which al-Jaṣṣāṣ justifies Ḥanafī legal doctrine through language, *bayān*, transmitted practice, and structured proof.⁶¹

This finding contributes to debates on madhhab authority by showing that school affiliation in classical Islamic law was not simply a matter of inherited loyalty. It was produced through legal reasoning, textual demonstration, and methodological coherence. Melchert's account of the formation of Sunni legal schools highlights the historical consolidation of juristic affiliations in the ninth and tenth centuries.⁶² while El Shamsy argues that legal authority emerged through processes of canonization, textual discipline, and scholarly transmission.⁶³ Al-Jaṣṣāṣ adds a more specific exegetical dimension to these arguments: the madhhab is not only formed in legal manuals, teaching circles, or chains of transmission, but also inside Qur'anic commentary. *Ahkām al-Qur'an* thus becomes a site where the Ḥanafī school presents itself as a textually grounded and theoretically disciplined tradition.

The implications are also methodological. Reading *Ahkām al-Qur'an* alongside *al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl* shows that al-Jaṣṣāṣ performs two interrelated tasks. In *al-Fuṣūl*, he elaborates the principles required to evaluate legal evidence, including *'amm*, *kbāṣṣ*, *mujmal*, *bayān*, *amr*, *nahy*, *naskh*, *kbabar*, *ijmā'*, *qiyās*, *istiḥṣān*, and *ijtihād*. In *Ahkām al-Qur'an*, he applies these principles to Qur'anic legal passages. The result is an epistemological rather than merely doctrinal defense of Ḥanafī law. He does not simply assert that a Ḥanafī position is correct; he demonstrates how it can be derived, defended, and ranked within a hierarchy of proofs. This supports the broader view that the Ḥanafī madhhab is rooted in structured methodology rather than unregulated rationalism, balancing textual fidelity with contextual responsiveness.⁶⁴

This point is particularly important because the Ḥanafī school has often been described through its association with reason, flexibility, and legal pragmatism. Such descriptions are useful but insufficient unless they explain how rational reasoning remains accountable to textual authority. Studies of Ḥanafī approaches to territorial jurisdiction, human inviolability, and socio-political change show that the school developed legal tools capable of responding to shifting historical circumstances while preserving continuity with inherited principles.⁶⁵ Likewise, the integration of state edicts into Ḥanafī legal frameworks demonstrates that the school maintained a pragmatic but methodologically mediated relationship with political authority.⁶⁶ Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's work reveals an earlier form of this balance: flexibility is not opposed to textuality, because legal adaptability is made possible through disciplined *uṣūlī* argument.

⁶¹ al-Jassas, *Ahkām Al-Qur'an*.

⁶² Melchert, *The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries C.E.*

⁶³ El Shamsy, *The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History*.

⁶⁴ S Ayoub, "the Sul.n Says: State Authority in the Late Hanafi Tradition," *Islamic Law and Society* 23, no. 3 (2016): 239–78, <https://doi.org/10.1163/15685195-00233p02>; M Khalfoui, "Together but Separate: How Muslim Scholars Conceived of Religious Plurality in South Asia in the Seventeenth Century," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 74, no. 1 (2011): 87–96, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0041977X1000073X>.

⁶⁵ R Şentürk, "Human Rights in Islamic Jurisprudence: Why Should All Human Beings Be Inviolable?," in *The Future of Religious Freedom: Global Challenges*, 2013, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199930890.003.0014>; S Ayoub, "Peace as a Legal Presumption in Islamic Law: Territoriality, Nationality, and the Promise of International Law," *Islamic Law and Society* 33, no. 1–2 (2026): 100–144, <https://doi.org/10.1163/15685195-bja10074>.

⁶⁶ Ayoub, "the Sul.n Says: State Authority in the Late Hanafi Tradition."

The role of *qiyās* further illustrates this dynamic. In Ḥanafī jurisprudence, *qiyās* is central because it allows jurists to extend rulings by identifying a shared legal rationale, or *'illa*, between established and new cases.⁶⁷ Yet in al-Jaṣṣāṣ's legal exegesis, *qiyās* is not an independent rational instrument detached from revelation. It operates within a textual and argumentative order shaped by *Qur'an*, *Sunnah*, *atsar*, *ijmā'*, and the rules of linguistic indication. This supports Kahya's argument that Ḥanafī debates over *qiyās* and *takhsīs al-'illa* reflect sophisticated attempts to clarify the epistemological foundations of legal reasoning and to address objections to analogical method.⁶⁸ It also explains why *qiyās* remains adaptable in contemporary legal fields, including Islamic finance, without losing its dependence on structured legal analogy.⁶⁹

The findings also have implications for how juristic polemic should be understood. Polemic in *Aḥkām al-Qur'an* is not merely adversarial rhetoric; it is a method of legal authorization. By presenting disagreement, evaluating rival proofs, and defending Ḥanafī conclusions, al-Jaṣṣāṣ transforms *ikhtilaf* into a disciplined procedure of doctrinal clarification. This aligns with scholarship showing that juristic polemics often emerge from deeper disagreements over interpretive methodology, legal rationale, and doctrinal principles.⁷⁰ Inter-madhab rivalries, such as those involving Mālikī and Shāfi'ī traditions, similarly shaped the refinement of legal doctrines and interpretive practices.⁷¹ Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's contribution is to place this polemical reasoning inside Qur'anic exegesis, thereby making *tafsīr* a venue for legal-theoretical contestation.

At the same time, the mazhabī character of *Aḥkām al-Qur'an* should not be treated as a methodological weakness. Modern assumptions sometimes regard school-based interpretation as partisan or apologetic, but this study suggests the opposite: *madhhab* affiliation can function as an interpretive discipline. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's commitment to the Ḥanafī school provides a framework for organizing evidence, ranking proofs, resolving ambiguity, and assessing legal disagreement. In this sense, madhhab-based argumentation is part of textual authority itself. Texts do not become legal proof in a vacuum; they are interpreted within communities that possess rules, assumptions, procedures, and standards of validity.

This insight also speaks to contemporary discussions of Islamic legal flexibility. The Ḥanafī tradition has often been associated with mechanisms such as *istiḥsān* and *'urf*, which allow jurists to reconcile legal doctrine with practical needs and changing social conditions.⁷² The phenomenon of juristic reversal, or *rujū' an al-ijtibād*, further shows that Ḥanafī legal reasoning could revise earlier positions in light of stronger evidence or altered socio-legal circumstances.⁷³ Similarly, the use of *talfīq* across madhhabs demonstrates the

⁶⁷ M S Hidayatullah, "Formulasi Rechtsvinding Dengan Penalaran Analogis Dalam Epistemologi Hukum Islam (Telaah Metodologi Qiyas Sebagai Ra'y Terhadap Mashādir Al-Aḥkām Asy-Syar'iyyah)," *Juris: Jurnal Ilmiah Syariah* 19, no. 2 (2020): 177–201, <https://doi.org/10.31958/juris.v19i2.2490>; Iqbal, "A General View of Qiyās: A Dialectical Reading"; A Ekinci, "Qalb and Aqs Objections Against The Illah According to Hanafī Jurists," *Mutefekkir* 9, no. 17 (2022): 107–30, <https://doi.org/10.30523/mutefekkir.1128631>.

⁶⁸ H K Kahya, "Diverging Paths: Transoxanian and Irāqī Approaches to Takhsīs Al-illa in the Hanafī Legal Theory," *Islam Arastirmalari Dergisi*, no. 55 (2026): 215–44, <https://doi.org/10.26570/isad.1735117>.

⁶⁹ N Nuraeni and M N Abdullah, "Qiyas Method of the National Sharia Board Fatwas and the Contemporary Islamic Economic Problems," *Jurnal Hukum Islam* 22, no. 2 (2024): 281–312, <https://doi.org/10.28918/jhi.v22i2.02>.

⁷⁰ Kahya, "Diverging Paths: Transoxanian and Irāqī Approaches to Takhsīs Al-illa in the Hanafī Legal Theory."

⁷¹ Y Dutton, *Original Islam: Malik and the Madhhab of Madina*, *Original Islam: Malik and the Madhhab of Madina*, 2012, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203426586>; G Wieggers, "Fuzzy Categories and Religious Polemics: The Daily Life of Christians and Muslims in the Medieval and Early Modern Mediterranean World," in *Common Knowledge*, vol. 19, 2013, 474–89, <https://doi.org/10.1215/0961754X-2281783>.

⁷² S I A Qaddumi, "The Change of Ijtihad in the Ḥanafī School: The Case of Imam Muḥammad," *Cumburiyet Ilahiyat Dergisi* 29, no. 2 (2025): 170–88, <https://doi.org/10.18505/cuid.1742639>; H Sulfinadia et al., "Negotiating Islamic Inheritance and Customary Law: Functional Legal Pluralism and Matrilineal Pusako Randa in Minangkabau," *Journal of Islamic Law* 7, no. 1 (2026): 1–30, <https://doi.org/10.24260/jil.v7i1.3743>.

⁷³ Qaddumi, "The Change of Ijtihad in the Ḥanafī School: The Case of Imam Muḥammad."

broader adaptability of Islamic legal traditions.⁷⁴ Although al-Jaṣṣāṣ's project is not a modern theory of legal reform, his exegetical method shows that adaptability depends on structured reasoning, not interpretive looseness.

The broader scholarly implication is therefore that *Ahkām al-Qur'an* should be read as a key text for understanding the intersection of Qur'anic exegesis, legal theory, and madhhab formation. It demonstrates that the Qur'an's function as legal proof is inseparable from the interpretive traditions that authorize its legal meanings. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ links Qur'anic authority to Ḥanafī authority not by subordinating revelation to doctrine, but by showing how doctrine is justified through disciplined engagement with revelation. This positions *Ahkām al-Qur'an* as an intellectually significant work for rethinking the relationship between scripture, legal method, and communal authority in classical Islamic law.

Conclusion

This article has shown that al-Jaṣṣāṣ constructs the *Qur'an* as legal proof in *Ahkām al-Qur'an* through a disciplined interaction between textual authority, linguistic analysis, and Ḥanafī juristic reasoning. Qur'anic legal verses are not treated as self-executing rulings; their normative force is established through *uṣūlī* procedures that identify meaning, classify textual indications, evaluate supporting proofs, and arrange them within a hierarchy of authority.

The study answers its objectives in three ways. First, al-Jaṣṣāṣ authorizes Qur'anic verses as legal proof by linking revelation with interpretive mechanisms such as *sunnah*, *khabar*, *atsar*, *ijmā'*, *qiyās*, and madhhab-based argumentation. Second, linguistic categories *lafz*, *dalālah*, *mujmal*, *bayān*, *qirā'ah*, *'amm*, *kbāṣṣ*, *amr*, and *nahy* function as legal instruments that transform Qur'anic wording into juristic doctrine. Third, Ḥanafī *uṣūl al-fiqh* structures his reasoning by organizing evidence, ranking proofs, and defending legal conclusions within a coherent madhhab framework.

The main theoretical contribution of this article is the concept of Qur'anic authority as procedural authority. In al-Jaṣṣāṣ's work, the *Qur'an* is authoritative not merely because it is cited, but because its legal meanings are produced through recognized methods of interpretation. This finding repositions *Ahkām al-Qur'an* as more than a legal *tafsīr*; it is an applied laboratory of Ḥanafī legal hermeneutics. Academically, the study contributes to Qur'anic studies, Islamic legal theory, and the history of Ḥanafī jurisprudence by showing how scripture, language, legal proof, and madhhab authority operate together in classical Islamic law. Future research may compare al-Jaṣṣāṣ with other authors of *ahkām al-Qur'an*, examine additional legal themes such as marriage, *ribā*, inheritance, and criminal law, or trace his influence on later Ḥanafī *uṣūl* and *tafsīr* traditions.

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⁷⁴ M H Jamaludin, A H Buang, and A Purkon, "Talfiq as A Method for Legal Solutions in Contemporary Islamic Law," *Abkam: Jurnal Ilmu Syariah* 24, no. 1 (2024): 55–66, <https://doi.org/10.15408/ajis.v24i1.33608>.

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